

amendment under paragraph (1) of this subsection.

SEC. 3. EXEMPTION FOR CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Section 242 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C.1715z-7) is amended—

(1) in subsection (b)(1)(B), by inserting “, unless the facility is a critical access hospital (as that term is defined in section 1861(mm)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395x(mm)(1)))” after “tuberculosis”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following:

“(i) TERMINATION OF EXEMPTION FOR CRITICAL ACCESS HOSPITALS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—The exemption for critical access hospitals under subsection (b)(1)(B) shall have no effect after July 31, 2006.

“(2) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 3 years after July 31, 2003, the Secretary shall submit a report to Congress detailing the effects of the exemption of critical access hospitals from the provisions of subsection (b)(1)(B) on—

“(A) the provision of mortgage insurance to hospitals under this section; and

“(B) the General Insurance Fund established under section 519.”.

SEC. 4. STUDY OF BARRIERS TO RECEIPT OF INSURED MORTGAGES BY FEDERALLY QUALIFIED HEALTH CENTERS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall conduct a study on the barriers to the receipt of mortgage insurance by Federally qualified health centers (as defined in section 1905(1)(2)(B) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1396d(1)(2)(B))) under section 1101 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1749aaa), or other programs under that Act.

(b) REPORT.—Not later than 6 months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shall submit a report regarding any appropriate legislative and regulatory changes needed to enable Federally qualified health centers to access mortgage insurance under section 1101 of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1749aaa), or other programs under that Act to—

(1) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; and

(2) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives.

The bill (H.R. 659), as amended, was read the third time and passed.

INCREASING THE FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION MORTGAGE COMMITMENT LEVEL

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate proceed to the immediate consideration of S. 1571.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will report the bill by title.

The legislative clerk read as follows:

A bill (S. 1571) to increase the Federal Housing Administration mortgage commitment level to carry out the purposes of section 203(b) of the National Housing Act.

There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill.

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the bill be read the third time and passed; that the motion to reconsider be laid upon the table; and that any statements relating to this measure be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The bill (S. 1571) was read the third time and passed, as follows:

S. 1571

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

Notwithstanding the first paragraph of the item in title II of Division K of the Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003 (Public Law 108-7) relating to “FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION – MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE PROGRAM ACCOUNT”, during the fiscal year 2003, commitments to guarantee loans to carry out the purposes of section 203(b) of the National Housing Act (12 U.S.C. 1709), shall not exceed a loan principal of \$185,000,000,000.

MEASURES PLACED ON THE CAL- ENDAR—S. 1434, S. 1490, S. 1504, H.R. 2799, AND H.R. 2861

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I understand there are five bills at the desk which are due for a second reading. I ask unanimous consent that the bills be given a second reading, en bloc, and I object to further proceedings on the measures at this time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The objection is noted. Under the rules, the bills will be placed on the calendar.

ORDER FOR PRINTING OF H.R. 6

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 6, as passed by the Senate on July 31, 2003, be printed.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

REMOVAL OF INJUNCTION OF SE- CRECY—TREATY DOCUMENT NO. 108-8

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, as in executive session, I ask unanimous consent that the injunction of secrecy be removed from the following protocol transmitted to the Senate on September 2, 2003, by the President of the United States: Protocol to Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with Denmark, treaty document 108-8.

I further ask that the protocol be considered as having been read the first time; that it be referred, with accompanying papers, to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed; and that the President's message be printed in the RECORD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

The message of the President is as follows:

To the Senate of the United States:

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Protocol to the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States and Denmark of October 1, 1951, signed at Copenhagen on May 2, 2001. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to this protocol.

The protocol will establish the legal basis by which the United States may issue treaty-investor (E-2) visas to qualified nationals of Denmark, by supplementing the U.S.-Denmark friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaty to allow for entry and sojourn of investors, a benefit provided in the large majority of U.S. FCN treaties. United States investors are already eligible for Danish visas that offer comparable benefits to those that would be accorded nationals of Denmark under E-2 visa status.

The United States has long championed the benefits of an open investment climate, both at home and abroad. It is the policy of the United States to welcome market-driven foreign investment and to permit capital to flow freely to seek its highest return. Denmark also provides an open investment climate. Visas for investors facilitate investment activity, and thus directly support U.S. policy objectives.

I recommend that the Senate consider this protocol as soon as possible, and give its advice and consent to ratification of the protocol at an early date.

GEORGE W. BUSH.

THE WHITE HOUSE, September 2, 2003.

ORDERS FOR TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 2, 2003

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it adjourn until 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, September 3. I further ask that following the prayer and the pledge, the morning hour be deemed expired, the Journal of proceedings be approved, the time for the two leaders be reserved and the Senate then resume consideration of H.R. 2660, the Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill.

I further ask unanimous consent that the Senate recess from 12:30 p.m. to 2:15 p.m. for the weekly party lunches.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

PROGRAM

Mr. DEWINE. Mr. President, for the information of all Senators, tomorrow the Senate will resume consideration of H.R. 2660, the Labor-HHS-Education appropriations bill. There are two pending amendments that were offered and debated during today's session. It is hoped that we will be able to schedule votes in relation to these amendments as early as possible tomorrow. The leader would like to alert all Members that rollcall votes can be expected at approximately 12 noon on Wednesday. Therefore, Senators should expect the possibility of votes prior to the party lunches and Members will be notified when the first vote is scheduled.

ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT

Mr. DEWINE. If there is no further business to come before the Senate, I

ask unanimous consent that the Senate adjourn under the previous order after the remarks of Senator BYRD.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

RELIEF FOR AMERICAN TROOPS

Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, Senators and Representatives are now returning to Washington, D.C., from their sojourns to their home districts. With the turn of a page on a calendar, the dog days of summer draw to a close, and our Nation's Capital City returns to life from its annual slumber. The business of government is set once more to spring into high gear as the oppressive heat of August turns to the cooler days of September.

Many of those who carry out the work of the American people were fortunate to escape the worst days of the oppressive Washington summer. But as policy makers return to their hectic schedules, we must remember that there are many thousands of Americans on the other side of the globe who were not afforded any relief from sweltering temperatures or allowed any bit of relaxation from their life-threatening missions.

There was no summer vacation for the 136,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, the 34,000 soldiers in Kuwait, or the 9,600 personnel in Afghanistan. These Americans sweated through all 31 days of August under their Kevlar helmets and heavy bulletproof vests. Many had no opportunity to enjoy the luxury of air conditioning or even a simple glass of ice water, for they were kept on high alert during every waking moment watching for snipers, booby traps, and assassins.

As the cost of our occupation of Iraq continues to grow, it is increasingly apparent to the American people that the White House has gotten the United States more deeply involved in Iraq than the administration's pre-war rhetoric would ever have led us to believe.

As of Friday, August 29, we have lost 282 Americans during the invasion and occupation of Iraq, and nearly 1,400 have been wounded during that time. The news today is of two more soldiers killed in a roadside bomb attack. The number of American lives lost is quickly approaching the total number of Americans killed during 1991's Operation Desert Storm, when 292 troops lost their lives to hostile fire and accidents.

The dangers of Iraq have shown no signs of abating. The August 19 bombing of the U.N. headquarters in Baghdad claimed the lives of 23 international aid workers, and the August 29 bombing of a mosque in Najaf appears to have killed more than 80 worshippers.

Only a handful of Iraqi leaders who are pictured on the military's most-wanted deck of cards remain at large, but the perpetrators of the attacks seem to be broadening their set of targets. It appears that the violence is not

just perpetrated by Iraqis, but that Iraq is becoming a new stage for terrorists to strike at the United States. The top Army officer in charge of ground troops in Iraq, General Ricardo Sanchez, spoke in July describing our occupation forces as a "terrorist magnet, where America, being present here in Iraq, creates a target of opportunity."

While the sons and daughters of America continue to patrol the shooting gallery in Iraq, progress toward bringing reinforcements from our friends and allies has proceeded at a miserable pace. For every foreign soldier in Iraq, there are nearly nine American troops. Other countries with sizable militaries, such as France, Germany, and India, have flatly refused to participate in the occupation of Iraq without a U.N.-authorized peacekeeping mission. Turkey, our staunch ally on the northern border of Iraq, has announced that it will delay a vote on sending peacekeepers until some time in October.

Does it really come as a surprise to anyone that many of our allies are reluctant to commit their own troops to the aftermath of a pre-emptive war, considering how the Administration tried to bully them during our headlong rush to war against Iraq? While the White House was furiously trying to twist arms in Berlin, Paris, Ankara, and Moscow to gain acquiescence to a war in Iraq, millions took to the streets to protest the President's policy toward Iraq.

According to polls released by the Pew Research Center on March 18, 2003, the day before the war began, opposition to a war in Iraq was at 69 percent in Germany, 75 percent in France, 86 percent in Turkey, and 87 percent in Russia. Yet the White House scoffed at this opposition and belittled the need to unify the world in confronting Saddam Hussein. Could it be that our troops are now paying the price for the Administration's bullheaded rush to war without the broad and active support of the international community?

But even if more international troops arrive under the Administration's plans, Americans should not be lulled into thinking that the threat to our troops will be over. Pentagon planners are now working to divide the occupation of Iraq among the British, an unidentified foreign force, and U.S. troops.

It appears that this plan will continue to have American troops bear the responsibility of patrolling the "Sunn triangle," where the bulk of the guerrilla attacks have been occurring. Our men and women in uniform will continue to walk through the dangerous back alleys of Baghdad, Tikrit, and Fallujah, facing daily attacks. For so long as U.S. troops continue to carry the overwhelming bulk of the occupation mission in Iraq, our troops will remain overburdened and under fire.

Let there be no doubt, our troops are stretched thin. On June 24, 2003, I requested a study by the Congressional

Budget Office on how a protracted mission in Iraq could affect our military readiness. In particular, I asked how many troops our armed forces can devote to a long-term occupation of Iraq, what stresses this might place upon the National Guard and the Reserves, and what costs and risks may be associated with the strain upon our forces.

The results of the CBO study, which will be released tomorrow, is quantified evidence that the long-term occupation is straining our forces close to the breaking point.

According to the advance copy of the CBO report that was delivered to my office today, if we are to rely primarily on the active duty Army to carry out the occupation of Iraq while maintaining our presence in Korea, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and elsewhere, we can only maintain 38,000 to 64,000 soldiers in Iraq and Kuwait over the long term.

Even if the Pentagon takes extraordinary measures, such as depending on large deployments of the National Guard and the Reserves and using Marines as peacekeepers, the CBO report estimates that we could still only sustain 67,000 to 106,000 troops in Iraq for the long term. The annual incremental cost for a continuing deployment of this size, assuming that the security situation becomes stable, could be up to \$19 billion per year.

Some have suggested that the strain on our soldiers in Iraq could be relieved by adding 2 new Army divisions to the existing 10. The CBO report estimates that this option would cost up to \$19.4 billion in one-time costs, would add another \$9.5 billion to \$10.1 billion to the annual defense budget, and would take from 3 to 5 years to field those troops.

The CBO report also analyzes how a large commitment of troops to Iraq would affect the ability of our armed forces to respond to a crisis elsewhere in the world, such as a North Korean invasion of South Korea. Not surprisingly, the larger the commitment the U.S. maintains in Iraq, the fewer troops we would have ready to respond to other threats. The statistics contained in the CBO report prompts more questions about the readiness of our military during a sustained occupation of Iraq.

The CBO also reports that our troop levels in Iraq will have to start declining by March 2004 if we hope to preserve readiness in our armed forces. Indeed, the Army has already drafted a plan to start rotating units in and out of Iraq by that time. But this plan also anticipates that foreign troops will arrive to take up the slack in the occupation mission created by a declining number of U.S. troops. So far, however, administration efforts to line up countries to join in this mission have been less than impressive.

That the White House failed to prepare the American public for the demands of post-war Iraq on our troops is painfully evident.

Now there are rumblings that the administration may be ready to swallow